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Abstract
Background: Providing financial incentives contingent on healthy behaviours is one way to encourage healthy
behaviours. However, there remains substantial concerns with the acceptability of health promoting financial
incentives (HPFI). Previous research has studied acceptability of HPFI to the public, recipients and practitioners.
We are not aware of any previous work that has focused particularly on the views of public health policymakers.
Our aim was to explore the views of public health policymakers on whether or not HPFI are acceptable; and what,
if anything, could be done to maximise acceptability of HPFI.
Methods: We recruited 21 local, regional and national policymakers working in England via gatekeepers and
snowballing. We conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with participants exploring experiences of, and
attitudes towards, HPFI. We analysed data using the Framework approach.
Results: Public health policymakers working in England acknowledged that HPFI could be a useful behaviour
change tool, but were not overwhelmingly supportive of them. In particular, they raised concerns about
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, potential ‘gaming’, and whether or not HPFI address the underlying causes of
unhealthy behaviours. Shopping voucher rewards, of smaller value, targeted at deprived groups were particularly
acceptable to policymakers. Participants were particularly concerned about the response of other stakeholders to
HPFI – including the public, potential recipients, politicians and the media.
Overall, the interviews reflected three tensions. Firstly, a tension between wanting to trust individuals and promote
responsibility; and distrust around the potential for ‘gaming the system’. Secondly, a tension between participants’
own views about HPFI; and their concerns about the possible views of other stakeholders. Thirdly, a tension
between participants’ personal distaste of HPFI; and their professional view that they could be a valuable behaviour
change tool.
Conclusions: There are aspects of design that influence acceptability of financial incentive interventions to public
health policymakers. However, it is not clear that even interventions designed to maximise acceptability would be
acceptable enough to be recommended for implementation. Further work may be required to help policymakers
understand the potential responses of other stakeholder groups to financial incentive interventions.
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Background
Engaging in health promoting behaviours helps reduce
morbidity and mortality with subsequent social, health-
care and economic benefits. Despite ongoing efforts to
encourage uptake of healthy behaviours, unhealthy be-
haviours remain common worldwide [1]. Providing fi-
nancial incentives contingent on healthy behaviours is
one method to encourage these behaviours. Health pro-
moting financial incentives (HPFI) have been defined as
cash or cash-like rewards or penalties provided directly
to individuals contingent on their performance of
healthy behaviours [2].
A number of systematic, and other, reviews support
the use of HPFI [3–11]. Non-systematic reviews have re-
ported that HPFI are more effective for ‘one off ’ behav-
iours such as attending for screening and vaccination,
than more complex behaviours such as smoking cessa-
tion [5, 7]. However, this is not confirmed in systematic
reviews. Systematic reviews find that the effects of HPFI
do not vary according to incentive value or target behav-
iour, but may be larger in more deprived groups [3, 4].
Whilst these systematic reviews find prolonged effects of
continuing incentives, effects after intervention removal
appear to decrease over time – although not necessarily
to extinction [3, 4, 11].
Despite this evidence of effect, the acceptability of
HPFI has been questioned and they have been criti-
cized as unethical, unfair and socially divisive [12,
13]. Acceptability of public health interventions can
be considered from the point of view of a number of
stakeholders. In the context of HPFI, these include
policymakers responsible for intervention develop-
ment, those responsible for intervention delivery, the
public who may finance interventions through tax-
ation, and potential recipients. All of these groups
must be willing and able to engage with HPFI if they
are to be widely implemented and their potential as
behaviour change interventions exploited [14].
In a recent systematic review on the acceptability of
HPFI [15], 22 empirical studies were identified. Most of
these (17 of 22) were conducted with members of the
public. Four studies in the review captured the views of
clinicians and other practitioners working with those
who received incentives [16–19]. These studies show
some belief that HPFI can be effective, but also
highlighted concerns around the ethics of offering re-
wards – although the specifics of these are not well
described. Whilst one study included a small number of
policymakers within their sample (n = 3 out of 30) [19],
we are not aware of any study that has specifically
focused on the views of public health policymakers and
decision-makers towards HPFI.
The views of public health policymakers and decision-
makers on HPFI may be particularly important as these
individuals are likely to play key roles in recommending,
or not, HPFI at a national level, and commissioning such
interventions at a local level. Understanding their views
on whether or not HPFI are appropriate interventions,
and barriers and facilitators to implementation, is im-
portant for developing strategies to maximise the poten-
tial of HPFI.
The aim of this research was, therefore, to explore the
views of public health policymakers and decision-makers
working in England, on whether or not HPFI interven-
tions are acceptable; and what, if anything, could be
done to maximise acceptability of HPFI.
Methods
We conducted a qualitative interview study with pub-
lic health policymakers and decision-makers (referred
to as ‘policymakers’ throughout) working in England.
Ethical approval was provided by Newcastle Univer-
sity’s Faculty of Medical Sciences Ethics Committee
(Approval Number: 00864; May 2015). We did not
collect consent to share data widely and data will not
be made available. The paper is reported in accord-
ance with the Consolidated Criteria for Reporting
Qualitative Research [20].
Participants
We recruited individuals working in positions where they
could influence and make decisions concerning the
commissioning or strategic direction of local, regional and
national public health improvement services in England.
Sampling was purposive and we aimed to recruit at least
six individuals working at each of the local, regional and
national levels. We focused on England, as public health
services are organised differently in other parts of the UK.
Recruitment
Participants were identified through key informants and
via ‘snowballing’ – that is, asking recruited participants
to suggest others who met the inclusion criteria and
might be interested in taking part in the research. We
purposively selected additional participants from
amongst those suggested via ‘snowballing’ to achieve our
intended sample mix.
Potential participants were contacted by letter or
email to introduce the study and provide a participant
information sheet. Follow up phone calls allowed po-
tential participants to ask questions and make ar-
rangements for interviews. Letters or emails were sent
confirming interview appointments (and providing a
further copy of the participant information sheet) one
week prior to interviews, with reminder phone calls,
or emails, the day before. Participants were offered a
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£20 high street shopping voucher as a ‘thank you’ for
taking part.
Data collection
ELG conducted interviews in person (n = 1) or by tele-
phone (n = 20) according to participant preference. Par-
ticipants took part in one interview each during working
hours. Only the participant and interviewer were present
during interviews.
Before interviews began, the researcher asked partici-
pants to confirm that they had read the information
sheet and if they had any questions. The researcher then
asked participants to complete a written consent form
and (during telephone interviews) return this via email.
A semi-structured topic guide shaped interviews
(Appendix 1). This was iteratively refined during inter-
views to improve question ordering and flow. We sent
participants a series of show cards to be used during inter-
views (Appendix 2) via email one week before interviews.
Interviews began with general questions concerning
the participant’s professional role. Then the researcher
introduced the concept of HPFI, read a definition of
HPFI developed from the peer-reviewed literature [2]
from a show card, and asked the participant to pro-
vide their general responses. Next, the researcher read
summary information from a recent systematic review
[4] on the effectiveness of HPFI from a show card
and asked participants if they had any specific re-
sponses to this ‘evidence’. Next, the researcher read
out three examples of HPFI schemes from show cards
and asked participants about the barriers and facilita-
tors to introducing such schemes - both in general
and from the specific perspective of their current pos-
ition. All of the example schemes were based on, or
adapted from, real scenarios [21–23] and were se-
lected to cover a range of different behaviours and
HPFI formats. Finally, the researcher summarised a
framework [2] describing different aspects of HPFI
design (from a show card) and asked participants
how these aspects of design influenced acceptability.
At the end of interviews, the researcher summarised the
key points covered and offered participants the chance to
add to, revise or clarify their views. Transcripts were not
returned to participants for checking and they were not
asked to provide feedback on the results.
Data analysis
With consent, all interviews were audio recorded and
transcribed verbatim for analysis alongside any interviewer
reflections. We used Framework Analysis [24] to analyse
transcripts. We developed an initial framework based on
preliminary analyses of concepts from interviews and the
results of our previous work on acceptability of HPFI [14,
15, 25–27]. We then applied this to the data to identify
and code pertinent extracts. Extracts that reflected con-
cepts insufficiently identified by the framework were used
to modify the framework. Thus, we iteratively refined the
framework until we had a definitive version that captured
all concepts and offered a coherent, structured, and cohe-
sive account of stakeholders’ views.
The first author (ELG) conducted coding using NVivo
software. Frequent discussions with the project lead (JA),
ensured that data interpretation was credible, valid and
shared [28].
Reflexivity
ELG is an experience qualitative researcher [13, 27,
29–31] with a PhD in public health research. At the
time interviews were conducted, she was working as
a research associate, and then senior lecturer, in
public health. The research was the final part of a
four year programme of work on HPFI that ELG
was employed on. Thus, ELG had an in-depth know-
ledge of HPFI. ELG had previously established pro-
fessional relationships with some, but not all, of the
participants before interviews were conducted.
Results
Twenty two individuals were invited to take part, and 21 in-
terviews were conducted during May-July 2015. One in-
vitee refused to take part as they had retired. Interviews
lasted for 20–47 min. Five participants were working at na-
tional, 10 at regional, and six at local level (see Table 1).
Nine participants were male. Eight participants worked in a
commissioning role, with some commissioning financial in-
centives, and others non-financial incentives (or a combin-
ation). Participants’ portfolios covered a range of public
health functions and areas.
The final coding framework is described in Table 2. The
results are described, and illustrated using verbatim quotes,
according to the two main research questions – factors in-
fluencing overall acceptability of HPFI; and what, if any-
thing, could be done to maximise acceptability. Methods of
maximising acceptability were primarily related to format
and design of HPFI schemes and these are described with
reference to a previously described framework [2].
Despite the concerns and issues described below,
participants acknowledged that HPFI could be useful in-
terventions. It was recognised that HPFI could be a “hook”
for encouraging people to adopt healthy behaviours; that
HPFI could help more than the individual who receives
the incentive (e.g. unborn children, if HPFI are targeted at
pregnant women); and that they can help to create a cul-
ture where healthy behaviours become the norm.
“So the micro, yes it will be better to the individual child,
absolutely, and the macro is if that small trial in turn
triggers community changes of behaviour…” [ID: 21]
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Factors influencing HPFI acceptability
Effectiveness and cost-effectiveness
Many participants discussed the need for robust evi-
dence on the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of HPFI
schemes. The implication being that HPFI could be
acceptable if they were demonstrably effective and
cost-effective. Evidence requirements for demonstrating
effectiveness were high with, for example, a demand for
evidence of effects sustained beyond 12 months follow
up and discussion about the potential selection bias of
existing studies. It is not clear if this standard of evi-
dence is required for all potential interventions, or if this
was driven by an underlying cautiousness about HPFI in
particular. The systematic review evidence presented in
the show card did not appear to change many views
towards HPFI.
“I think we’ll be much more open as a Public Health
community to using incentives, but at the moment
most of what I’ve seen has been maximum of kind of a
year follow-up.” [ID:16]
“Well I think inevitably and absolutely unavoidably
there is a selection bias in the people who participate
in these studies … I think evidence on individual level
behaviour change of any sort is making a biased
comparison.” [ID:18]
The current context of public sector austerity in England
appeared to drive a particular interest in cost-effective, and
even cost-saving, public health interventions.
“I think the, you know, obviously the biggest factor is
the question of how effective they are and whether they
are cost-effective [and] cost-saving…” [ID: 02]
“It’s much easier to make an argument, as I was
saying earlier, where you can demonstrate a cost-
saving element to what’s being done rather than an
additional cost in order to encourage the behaviour.”
[ID: 02]
Table 1 Participant characteristics
Participant
ID
Geographical level
of current position
Current
portfolio
Currently employed in
a commissioning role
1 Regional Smoking
cessation
No
2 Local Public health Yes
3 Regional Public health Yes
4 Regional Alcohol No
5 Regional Smoking
cessation
No
6 Regional Health
protection
No
7 National Public health Yes
8 Local Public health Yes
9 Regional Public policy No
10 National Public health Yes
11 Regional Drugs and
alcohol
No
12 Local Sexual health Yes
13 Local Sexual health Yes
14 Local Substance
misuse
Yes
15 Regional Mental
health
No
16 National Health and
wellbeing
No
17 Local Public health No
18 National Unknown Unknown
19 Regional Health
improvement
No
20 Regional Public health No
21 National Public health No
Table 2 Coding tree
Code Description
Potential benefits
Initial motivation HPFI generate initial motivation
for healthy behaviours
Practical considerations
Effectiveness Considerations around initial
and long-term effectiveness
Cost-effectiveness Considerations around value-for-money
Monitoring Considerations around ‘gaming’
and how this can be avoided
Intervention paradigm HPFI do not address the ‘root
causes’ of unhealthy behaviours
Views of others Considerations around how other
stakeholders may view HPFI
Ethical considerations
Culture of entitlement HPFI create a culture of entitlement
Discrimination HPFI are discriminatory and divisive
Incentive design format
Direction A positive reward or negative penalty
Form Cash, vouchers, or specific goods
and services
Certainty Certain, uncertain chance, or
certain chance
Magnitude Total value of the incentive
Recipient Individual, group, significant
other, clinician or parent
‘Other’ issues
Free coding… …
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Monitoring and avoidance of ‘gaming’
Participants raised concerns about ‘gaming the system’ –
where individuals lie about their behaviour in order to
gain rewards that they are not entitled to. This led to dis-
cussions about whether health behaviours could ever be
monitored well enough to ensure that all gaming was
identified. There appeared to be concerns that monitoring
and avoiding gaming would place such heavy demands on
schemes that they would become unworkable.
“I think it’s any scheme is open to misuse and I think
you will always get the edited version from somebody
and some of it is the hard measured stuff is obviously
far more robust.” [ID:13]
Intervention paradigm
Some participants felt that HPFI failed to address
the root causes of unhealthy behaviours. In particular,
HPFI were identified as individual-level (rather than
population-level) interventions that fail to change the con-
text in which behaviours are performed. For this reason,
HPFI were identified as a “sticking plaster”, rather than a
longer term solution. Thus HPFI were identified as re-
inforcing a flawed focus on individual, rather than envir-
onmental and social, determinants of health behaviours.
“I think they may have a part to play but I’m very
concerned that the vast majority of the activities that
we see taking place in relation to lifestyle behaviours
are focused on trying to change the behaviour of
individuals rather than trying to change the
environment.” [ID:18]
“… you’d like to think that adults could be better
educated earlier on in say the schooling years to
become aware of healthier options, healthier choices.
And that would in my view be a more effective, more
strategic approach to the problem than the short-term
sticking plaster [of incentives].” [ID:21]
Views of other stakeholders
Participants were often concerned about how other key
stakeholders would perceive HPFI. These included:
elected politicians, the wider public, recipients of HPFI,
and the media. There was a strong feeling that all of
these stakeholders would have to find HPFI acceptable
before they could be implemented.
“…we obviously need the buy-in of our partner organi-
sations, of our commission services … making sure that
the [elected, local] Councillors are on board, that
you’re not going to get a negative public backlash,
things like that are a bit more secondary but the buy-
in is the crucial one.” [ID:08]
“And again, you know, if you get into those large types
of things then you’re going to have a lot more political
wrangling and you know, perhaps negative press and
things, so you have to be very careful with it.” [ID:19]
Some responses in relation to more versus less accept-
able formats of HPFI (described below) appeared to re-
late to perceptions of what would be most acceptable to
other stakeholders. For example, whilst participants be-
lieved that recipients of HPFI would value cash more
than voucher rewards, vouchers were perceived to be
more acceptable to other stakeholders and so preferable.
Similarly, whilst participants acknowledged that recipi-
ents might prefer higher value rewards, these were felt
to be less acceptable to other stakeholders and, hence,
smaller value rewards were preferable overall.
“Again, it’s that balance, isn’t it, what’s the value to
the client to make it worthwhile? So, again, that would
be quite interesting to look at. Are they more likely to
engage in positive behaviour if it’s £5 or £10 or
whatever? What size incentive is necessary and I guess
we don’t know that really.” [ID:03]
Ethical concerns
Irrespective of whether HPFI were effective and cost-
effective, many participants felt uneasy with the ap-
proach for moral and ethical reasons. Two key con-
cerns were highlighted – that HPFI may generate a
“culture of entitlement” encouraging a belief that
healthy behaviours should be instantly rewarding, and
that HPFI discriminate against those who already pur-
sue healthy behaviours.
“I think there’s a long term risk that you’re generating
an instant reward culture for behaviour change which
is quite dangerous actually.” [ID:16]
“… it’s not ethical, you know, I’ve got them, you know,
actually we’ve got lots of people who are already
engaged in healthy behaviours and so why should they
not be able to access some incentive for [that]
already?” [ID:17]
Maximising acceptability
Direction of incentive – rewards versus penalties and
deposit schemes
The majority of participants thought that reward-
based incentives were more acceptable than penalties
or deposit schemes. This was mainly because they felt
rewards provided a positive recognition of the effort
made by individuals attempting behaviour change.
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“I would always favour rewards as opposed to
penalties… It’s reinforcing the positivity of the
intervention.” [ID:03]
Deposit schemes were viewed unfavourably by most
participants as they were perceived as excluding large
groups who did not have money to spare – often the very
groups felt to be most in need of help to improve their
health.
“I think that there’s something very odd about requiring
the individual to deposit a lump sum at the beginning
… it would immediately exclude a pretty large part of
the population we wanted to try and get it to, because
they simply wouldn’t have the money to do that.”
[ID:02]
“My initial response was ‘gosh, how middle class’, you
know? I can’t imagine any of the deprived
communities that I have worked with directly being
able to deposit a lump sum like that into a scheme
and to risk not getting it back.” [ID:05]
Whilst participants generally did not respond well
to penalties, these were noted as potentially effective
at encouraging individual motivation. There was also
a suggestion that a penalty deposit scheme could
work with deprived communities, if the deposit was
made on behalf of recipients.
“I think it’s psychologically quite different if I give them
that money and they lost it and got it, you know, this is
developing their own internal incentive, and I like that
a lot.” [ID:11]
“I think you could do it with deprived communities in that
you could deposit an amount of money on their behalf and
say you know, if you stick to it for this long you get so much
of it …, and as time goes on ultimately they get all of it.”
[ID:05]
Form – cash versus vouchers
There was a common view that cash rewards were “more
honest” than shopping voucher rewards and would allow
individuals more freedom to use rewards as they chose.
Despite this, cash was generally considered to be un-
acceptable in practice, because of the potential for “abuse”:
particularly spending reward money on unhealthy prod-
ucts such as tobacco.
“… what you wouldn’t want to give them is you know,
£10, £12 to an individual because they’ve successfully
lost weight only for them to potentially go and spend
that money on a box of cigarettes…” [ID:14]
There was also a view that vouchers would encourage
recipients to “save up” rewards to purchase a larger item,
rather than “fritter away” small amounts of cash.
“… so if you’ve got sort of not hard cash but some
other cash equivalent that you can save up to get
something more meaningful, which was our experience
of the women in the scheme.” [ID:05]
Certainty - certain versus uncertain (lottery) rewards
Some participants felt that incentives should be certain
– that is, that all potential recipients should receive a re-
ward if they undertook the behaviour of interest – and
not the result of a lottery for all those doing so. These
individuals felt that uncertain rewards were unjust and
potentially demotivating for recipients.
“I just think if I was taking part in something that I’d
been promised a reward if I do A and then actually I
don’t get it because of, it’s only a chance, so someone
else gets it, I’d feel that was really unjust and I’d feel
cheated.” [ID:05]
Others felt that as long as the chance of winning with
a lottery-based HPFI were made transparent, such ap-
proaches were acceptable.
“…so transparency I guess is really important and also
the fact that they know the reward, the chance is there
all of the time with lottery and/or they’re going to get
a positive reward each time.” [ID:14]
Magnitude
Overall, participants preferred smaller value rewards –
although they were generally unable to articulate what a
small value was. Larger rewards were often considered
akin to bribery and as providing too much temptation to
‘game the system’. Reward value also raised issues of
cost, cost-effectiveness and cost-saving discussed above.
“Yeah, it would have to be a relatively low value for it
to be acceptable.” [ID:03]
“I mean there are massive issues around costs at the
moment … so the idea of using financial incentives in
the time of austerity is probably something that we …
aren’t going to get to look at … because at the moment,
we’re looking at where we can make efficiencies.” [ID:17]
Recipients – targeting, and individual versus groups
There was a general feeling that HPFI would be more ac-
ceptable if they were targeted at more vulnerable groups,
particularly those living in deprived communities.
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“So I think it would be more acceptable for women
from deprived communities … If it was something like
that … it would just feel fairer.” [ID:17]
“It feels a little bit better because it’s a targeted
intervention so it really is targeting the deprived
community.” [ID:03]
Group-based incentives were considered as useful in
fostering peer support, but there was also a concern that
this could lead to some individuals being alienated.
“I quite like the reinforcing nature of that as kind of
your reward being partly dependent on the behaviour
of others as part of your team and that being a
reinforcing measure.” [ID:01]
“I think that’s probably fraught with difficulty, so it
could work well but equally you can see how the
person who lets his or her behaviour slip is then seen
as letting down the whole group and it could have all
sorts of negative consequences.” [ID:18]
Discussion
This is the first study that we are aware of exploring the
acceptability of HPFI to public health policymakers. Public
health policymakers in our sample did not show universal
or overwhelming support for HPFI, despite being provided
with systematic review evidence supporting the effective-
ness of HPFI. However, policymakers did acknowledge
that HPFI could be a useful behaviour change tool. Areas
of particular concern were doubt over the effectiveness
and cost-effectiveness of HPFI, uncertainty about whether
‘gaming’ could be effectively and efficiently identified and
prevented, and wariness that HPFI fail to address the
underlying determinants of unhealthy behaviours. Partici-
pants also felt uneasy about the possibility that HPFI
create and reinforce an expectation of instant rewards and
discriminate against those who pursue healthy behaviours
without financial rewards.
Public health policymakers identified a number of
design elements that should be associated with more ac-
ceptable HPFI schemes. These included offering vouchers
rather than cash, rewards rather than penalties, certain
rather than lottery-based rewards, smaller value rewards
(although these were not well defined), and incentives
targeted at vulnerable groups – particularly those living in
more deprived areas. Participants often seemed to second
guess how other stakeholders, such as elected politicians,
the public, and the media, would view HPFI and were
particularly cautious of attracting negative responses from
these stakeholders.
Strengths and limitations of methods
Data saturation was achieved after around 19 interviews,
indicating that the sample size was large enough. Quali-
tative research is not intended to be ‘generalisable’. In-
stead, validity is assessed in terms of triangulation and
transferability of findings. As little previous research has
explored acceptability of HPFI to policymakers, direct
comparisons are not possible. However, as discussed
below, findings were similar to other qualitative studies
on the acceptability of HPFI to other groups [27, 32].
This increases the credibility of our findings.
We had clear research questions, structured our inter-
view guide around these questions and report our results
in relation to these research questions. Whilst this
Framework Approach ensures that our results clearly re-
flect our aims, such an approach could be considered re-
strictive. We overcame this by using open coding to
capture issues not initially anticipated.
Interpretation of findings and comparison to previous
results
Participants repeatedly stressed the need for new inter-
ventions to be cost-effective or even cost-saving. Other
research has documented public concerns about the po-
tential costs, and cost-effectiveness, of HPFI [13, 27, 32].
However, as far as we are aware, this is the first time
cost-saving has been raised and this reflects the current
climate of austerity and public sector cuts in English
local government (where public health services are cur-
rently located). There is very little evidence concerning
cost-effectiveness of HPFI. One recent randomised con-
trolled trial of incentives of up to £400 (US$567) for
smoking cessation during pregnancy reported a cost per
quality-adjusted life-year gained of £482 (US$671) [33].
This figure is well below the current working maximum
in England of £20–30,000 (US$28,779–43,168) per qual-
ity adjusted life-year gained [34], but does not reflect a
cost-saving intervention (where the health-care savings
achieved by an intervention outweigh the costs).
Although we provided participants with a summary of
evidence from a recent systematic review on the effect-
iveness of HPFI [4], this appeared to have little influence
on their views. This may because we introduced the evi-
dence summary after we had invited participants to give
their general reflections on HPFI: participants may have
felt the evidence summary undermined the views they
had already voiced. Alternatively, as peer-reviewed litera-
ture is only one type of ‘evidence’ that public health
policymakers consider [35, 36], the other issues and
concerns identified by participants may have been as, or
more, important influences on their views than a sys-
tematic review. Some participants were critical of the
existing research on HPFI – identifying selection bias
and lack of long term follow-up as particular problems.
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This may explain their concerns about lack of effective-
ness. Alternatively, underlying disquiet about HPFI may
have led participants to be hyper-critical of research
evidence.
As previously [13, 15, 27], participants were wary of
the potential for ‘gaming’, where participants lie in order
to gain rewards they are not entitled to. In trials of HPFI,
little evidence of gaming has been documented [37]. It
is, therefore, not clear if our participants’ concern was
with preventing gaming itself, or with being seen to be
preventing gaming. Previous authors have proposed
restricting HPFI to behaviours that can be accurately
measured in order both to prevent gaming and to show
that this was being done [38].
A number of participants identified that HPFI do
not address more distal, social, determinants of health
and health behaviours and, as such, are unlikely to
lead to sustained behaviour change. Other authors
have expressed similar concerns that HPFI do not ad-
dress the ‘root’ causes of unhealthy behaviours [12].
Whilst there is evidence that HPFI can have effects
that last for at least 12 months after intervention
withdrawal [4], longer term effects are not well docu-
mented. It is often suggested that HPFI act as exter-
nal motivators that ‘crowd out’ internal motivation
meaning effects are unlikely to be sustained once they
are withdrawn [15]. Whilst ‘crowding out’ has been
extensively reported in laboratory studies of economic
behaviour [39], it does not appear to occur in relation
to HPFI for health behaviours [40].
Our finding that policymakers prefer shopping
vouchers to cash rewards reflects previous qualitative
work with both members of the public and health
care providers [22, 27, 41]. As previously, we found
that participants were particularly concerned about
the potential for recipients to use cash rewards to
purchase unhealthy commodities such as tobacco
and alcohol [27, 42, 43]. However, these findings
contrast with those of two recent discrete choice
experiments, that collected anonymous on-line data
from members of the public, and found preferences
for cash over voucher incentives [44, 45]. This dis-
crepancy may be reflected in our participants’ recog-
nition that, whilst recipients of HPFI would likely
prefer cash, other stakeholders may not. Participants
appeared to ‘second guess’ the preferences of other
stakeholders, believing that vouchers were politically
‘safer’ than cash.
The preference for designing HPFI to encourage ‘sav-
ing up’, rather than ‘frittering away’, has been reported
previously [46]. This may be linked to a conceptualisa-
tion of HPFI as serving dual purposes, particularly when
targeted at disadvantaged populations: both as rewards,
and as a tool to improve economic circumstances.
Previous research has documented individual differences
in how recipients choose to use HPFI rewards [46]. Clar-
ity on what purpose HPFI should serve and how much
recipients should be restricted in what they spend them
on, may help in designing maximally acceptable HPFI.
Our finding of a strong preference for targeting HPFI
at disadvantaged populations has been reported previ-
ously in a qualitative study with members of the public
[27] and may reflect a perception that HPFI may be
most effective in more disadvantaged people [38]. Whilst
this makes intuitive sense, there is very limited evidence
concerning differential effectiveness of HPFI by socio-
economic status [4]. Furthermore, it is not a universal
finding that targeted HPFI are preferred [32, 44]. An al-
ternative explanation of the preference for targeted
schemes is that these may be considered both cheaper
(as fewer people are eligible for rewards), and more cost-
effective (because a higher proportion of people may
respond).
Ultimately our interviews with policymakers identified
three areas of tension. The first was a tension between
wanting to trust individuals, and designing incentive
schemes that promote individual accountability and re-
sponsibility; and an inherent distrust of individuals with
concerns around individuals gaming the system. Secondly,
there was a tension between participants’ own views; and
concerns about the possible views of other stakeholders
such as the public, media and politicians. Thirdly, there
was a tension between personal and professional views on
incentives; policymakers sometimes suggested a distaste
for HPFI on a personal level, but could see the value of
them from a professional point of view.
Implications for policy, practice and research
Overall, we found that policymakers raised similar con-
cerns about HPFI as other stakeholder groups [13, 15,
27]. However, policymakers appear to be unique in
explicitly considering the possible views of other stake-
holders when considering the acceptability of HPFI.
Our results suggest that HPFI would be more accept-
able to UK policymakers if there was further evidence of
long-term effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, and ro-
bust strategies to explicitly minimise gaming. Schemes
that provided shopping voucher rewards, of smaller
value, particularly targeted at deprived group would be
most acceptable to policymakers.
Whilst there is limited evidence on the cost-
effectiveness of HPFI, there are now a number of system-
atic, and other, reviews of effectiveness [3, 4, 6, 7, 25]. Re-
searchers should focus their efforts on establishing cost-
effectiveness and communicating results to policymakers.
Given participants’ concerns with others’ views on
HPFI, there may be a need for further qualitative work
to uncover the views of these groups. Research suggests
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that media coverage of HPFI in the UK is generally over-
all balanced, or favourable [47], and policymakers could
be reassured of this. Effective communication of the re-
sults of existing research on acceptability of HPFI may
help policymakers understand key areas of concern and
how these could be overcome.
Conclusions
Public health policymakers working in England acknowl-
edged that HPFI could be useful behaviour change tools,
but were not overwhelmingly supportive of these inter-
ventions. They raised particular concerns about effective-
ness and cost-effectiveness, potential ‘gaming’, and
whether or not HPFI address the underlying causes of un-
healthy behaviours. Shopping voucher rewards, of smaller
value, targeted at deprived groups were most acceptable.
Appendix 1 - Interview topic guide
Introductions, information, questions, & consent
Initial responses to generic concept of financial incen-
tives for healthy behaviours
Reaction to information on effectiveness of financial
incentives for healthy behaviours
Specific examples of financial incentives for healthy
behaviours
Example 1: breastfeeding
Example 2: smoking in pregnancy
Example 3: weight loss
Aspects of design of financial incentives for health
behaviours
Close and thank you
Appendix 2 - Text of show cards
Show card 1
A definition of financial incentives: “cash or cash-like re-
wards or penalties provided to, or imposed on, individuals
contingent on their performance of healthy behaviours”
Show card 2
Recent systematic review evidence: “We conducted a
systematic review of controlled evaluations of the effect-
iveness of financial incentive interventions, compared to
no intervention or usual care, to encourage healthy be-
haviour change, in non-clinical adult populations, living
in high-income countries. On average, incentives were
2.5 times more effective than usual care for smoking
cessation in the short term (<6 months) and 1.5 times as
effective in the longer term. Financial incentives were
1.9 times more effective than usual care for encouraging
people to attend for vaccination or screening. Overall,
incentives were 1.6 as effective as usual care in encour-
aging uptake of healthy behaviours.”
Show card 3
Example 1, breastfeeding: “A local authority in
Yorkshire has low breastfeeding initiation and main-
tenance rates. New mothers are offered £200 in cash
if they are still doing any breastfeeding at 6 months.
Peer supporters continue to provide normal health,
advice and support. This example is based on a pilot
scheme being evaluated by researchers at the Univer-
sity of Sheffield.”
Show card 4
Example 2, smoking in pregnancy: “A region in Scotland
has high rates of smoking in deprived, pregnant women.
Pregnant women are offered cessation support from com-
munity pharmacies. They set a quit date and then return
weekly for support over 12 weeks. Each week that they re-
turn and provide a smoke-free breath test they are
rewarded with £12.50 in supermarket vouchers. This ex-
ample is based on the ‘Give it up for baby’ programme in
Tayside, Scotland.”
Show card 5
Example 3, weight loss: “A local authority on the south
coast of England has high overweight and obesity rates.
They commission an online weight loss and mainten-
ance service that provides weight loss resources and in-
centives. Participants are provided with an individualised
health weight loss plan and supervised weigh-ins take
place monthly. Participants deposit a lump sum at the
start of the programme and receive a proportion of this
back each month for every pound that they lose – up to
a maximum of £425 over one year. This example is
based on the ‘Pounds for pounds’ programme in Kent.”
Show card 6
1. Reward or penalty/deposit contract
2. Cash or shopping vouchers or specific ‘prizes’
3. Total value
4. Everyone eligible receives reward/penalty, or lottery
to determine who receives
5. Reward/penalty for doing something that should help
people adopt healthier behaviours (e.g. attending a
health promotion session) or for actually adopting
healthier behaviours (e.g. taking more steps per day)
6. All instances of healthy behaviours rewarded/
penalised or only some instances
7. Fixed reward/penalty or escalating schedule – the
longer you stick to the programme, the higher
the reward
8. Reward/penalty given to individuals or groups of
individuals working together
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